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ABSTRACT
This article aims to highlight the major historical and 
geopolitical characteristics of Central Asia. Various 
geopolitical currents highlight the prominence of Central 
Asia under the geostrategic and global economy. Authors 
such as H. Mackinder or Z. Brzezinski, stressed the 
importance of the ‘Heartland’ (i.e. the Eurasian Balkans), 
while is ‘world axis’ and geopolitical space. The central 
argument is that this is a region of major importance in 
the current economic arena as a result of its strategic 
position as a link between East and West, a space of 
competition and reinforcement of the great powers. By 
revisiting history and through a literature review, this 
paper aims to contribute to increase knowledge about a 
remote region of the world, but of utmost importance in 
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the geopolitical and economic context of today. Besides, the region has been, in recent 
years, attracting the attention of foreign investors due to the existence of large reserves 
of oil and gas.
Keywords: Central Asia; history; geopolitics; post-Soviet space; Central Asian Republics
ASIA CENTRAL: LO SOBRESALIENTE DE SU HISTORIA Y GEOGRAFÍA
RESUMEN
Este artículo tiene como objetivo destacar las principales características históricas y 
geopolíticas de Asia Central. Diversas corrientes geopolíticas destacan la importancia de 
Asia Central bajo la geoestratégica y la economía global. Autores como H. Mackinder o Z. 
Brzezinski, destacaron la importancia del ‘Heartland’ (es decir, los Balcanes euroasiáticos), 
mientras ‘eje del mundo’ y espacio geopolítico. El argumento central es que esta es una 
región de gran importancia en el escenario económico actual, como resultado de su posición 
estratégica como nexo entre Oriente y Occidente, un espacio de competencia entre las 
grandes potencias. Al revisar la historia y a través de una revisión de la literatura, este trabajo 
pretende contribuir a aumentar el conocimiento sobre una región remota del mundo, pero 
de suma importancia en el contexto geopolítico y económico de hoy. Además, la región 
sigue, en los últimos años, atrayendo la atención de los inversores extranjeros debido a la 
existencia de grandes reservas de petróleo y gas.
Palabras clave: Asia Central, la historia, la geopolítica, el espacio post-soviético, las repúblicas 
de Asia central
ÁSIA CENTRAL: O PREPODERANTE NA SUA HISTÓRIA E GEOGRAFIA 
RESUMO
 
O objetivo desde trabalho é destacar as principais características históricas e geopolíticas 
da Ásia Central. Várias correntes geopolíticas enfatizam a importância da Ásia Central 
sob a geoestratégica e a economia global. Autores como H. Mackinder ou Z. Brzezinski, 
destacaram a importância de “Heartland” (ou seja, os Balcãs eurasiáticos), enquanto ‘eixo 
do mundo’ e espaço geopolítico. O argumento central é que esta é uma região de grande 
importância no cenário econômico atual, como resultado de sua posição estratégica como 
enlace entre o Oriente e o Ocidente, uma zona de competição entre as grandes potências. 
Ao analisar a história e através de uma revisão da literatura, este trabalho pretende contribuir 
para aumentar o conhecimento sobre uma região afastada do mundo, mas de grande 
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importância no contexto geopolítico e econômico de hoje. Além disso, a região continua, 
nos últimos anos, atraindo a atenção de investidores estrangeiros devido à existência de 
grandes reservas de petróleo e gás.
Palavras-chave: Ásia Central, história, geopolítica, espaço pós-soviético, repúblicas da Ásia 
Central.
INTRODUCTION
This article aims to highlight the major historical and geopolitical features of Central Asia. The 
central argument is that this is a region of major importance in the current economic sphere 
as a result of its strategic position as a link between East and West, space of competition and 
reinforcement of the great powers.
Central Asia is one of the pivot regions of the world. It is located in the nucleus of the Eurasian 
continental space and is a crucial link between several robust and dynamic economies, such 
as China, the European Union, India, Japan and Russia (Competitiveness Outlook, 2011). 
According to Khwaja, “Central Asia owes its importance to the vast economic potential and 
geostrategic location it has been endowed with, considering it is progressively turning into a 
world economic center” (2003: 7).
Under the new energy atlas, Central Asia is located in a strategic region, with strong ties to 
neighboring regions. Its development depends, firstly, on the access to the rest of the world. 
Central Asia is an important part of the political and economic world system, being “surrounded 
by some of the most dynamic economies in the world, including three of the so-called BRIC 
countries (Russia, India and China)” (Central Asia Competitiveness Outlook, 2011: 10). As 
Armando Marques Guedes stresses (2011), “Central Asia is, somehow, a hinge zone”, which 
has “regained undoubtedly an extraordinary importance both structural and conjunctural”. 
According to this expert, “if there were three major milestones of the 21st century, conflicts 
that had an effective impact on the reconstruction and creation of a new international order, 
these would be Afghanistan, Iraq and the invasion of Georgia by the Russian Federation” 
(Guedes, 2011). Interestingly, according to the author, “these three conflicts occurred in Central 
Asia” (Guedes, 2011). Note also that if there is “a conflict that humanity currently fears”, this 
involves Iran, which is no other than “a southern extension of Central Asia” (Guedes, 2011). For 
centuries, Central Asia has been the crossroads of Eurasia, or, as noted by Jack Caravelli (2011), 
“the intersection between East and West”, which makes, according to this author, the region 
“interesting”. Indeed, it is the point of confluence of four civilizations that have both controlled 
and been controlled by Central Asian peoples (Asimov and Bosworth, 1998). Moreover, as 
noted by Xiaojie Xu, “the civilizations that dominate the region have been able to exert their 
influence in other parts of the world” (1999: 33).
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1. THE BENDS OF HISTORY AND GEOGRAPHY
Before the arrival of the Russians, Central Asia was an integrated entity at the cultural, 
linguistic and religious level (Dani and Masson, 1992). The colonization process, initiated 
by czarist Russia, was the starting point for the fragmentation of the region, and has been 
specially designed to support the power structure of the colonizer (Bacon, 1966). This logic 
of fragmentation was continued and strengthened by the Soviets (Encyclopædia Britannica, 
2013). Fourniau explains that, from a historical point of view, “the region was either integrated 
into world-empires, during very short periods, either divided over long periods” (2006: para. 
22). The various entities that make up Central Asia, often correspond to “successor states of 
these world-empires (as the sovereign states today are the successors of the Soviet Republics)” 
(Fourniau, 2006: para. 22).
According to Gleason, “the first inhabitants of Central Asia were nomads who traveled from 
the north and from east to west and south” (1997: 27). The regional names ‘Transoxiana’ or 
‘Ma Wara’un-Nahr’, among other names for Central Asia have resulted from foreign invasions 
(Dani and Masson, 1992). The Samanid dynasty of Persia succeeded after the Arab governance 
during the 9th and 10th century (Esengul, 2009). The era of the Great Khan of the Mongols, 
Chingis Khan, began in the thirteenth century (Esengul, 2009). The empire of Chingis Khan left 
a legacy of Turkish languages which replaced Persian and Arabic (Carrere d’ Encausse, 1967). 
The Mongols destroyed the main Persian and Arabic centers of learning and trade, which helped 
Turkish languages  become dominant in the region (Dani and Masson, 1992). After the death of 
the Great Khan in 1227, his descendants divided Central Asia, and the region remained divided 
until the governance of Timur ‘the lame’, which united the small Turkish tribes in the middle of 
the fourteenth century (Dani and Masson, 1992). According to Hye Lee “the Russians had a first 
contact with Central Asia in 1715 when Peter the Great sent the first Russian military expedition 
into the Kazakh steppe, but the real effort to conquer the region took place in the nineteenth 
century, around 1860” (2012: para. 5). Since then, the valleys of Central Asia were divided into 
three khanates: Bukhara (the oasis of Zerafshan), Khiva (downstream of the Amur-Darya) and 
Khokand (Fergana Valley) (Gleason, 1997).
The foreign invasions were not limited to acts of conquest, to the extent that they generated 
a vast cultural interaction. Offering a fusion of cultures, languages , religions and people, they 
contributed in making the notion of identity in the region extremely complex (Dani and Masson, 
1992). The main Central Asian informal institutions that have proven to stand the test of time 
were the tribes and clans (Esengul, 2009). It is not surprising, therefore, that more and more 
experts in Central Asian affairs highlight the importance of clan politics with regard to the 
control they exert on the economy and politics of the region (Collins, 2006). Among the Central 
Asians, loyalty to the family or village is the most important at the sub-ethnic level (Dani and 
Masson, 1992). This loyalty is based on the core of the political organization of society: the 
family (Dani and Masson, 1992).
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From the historical point of view, Central Asia was called Turkestan, whose literal translation 
from the Persian means ‘the land of the Turks’ (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2013). The dominant 
linguistic group of Turkestan was formed by the Turkish languages  such as Turkmen, Uzbek, 
Kyrgyz and Kazakh (Bruchis, 1984). Geographically, the territory of Turkistan extended from 
the east area of the Caspian Sea to the Altay Mountains, and from the borders of Persia and 
Afghanistan in the south, to the Russian lands in the north (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2013). 
It had been divided into two parts: Western Turkestan and Eastern Turkestan (Dani and 
Masson, 1992). The Russians occupied the three khanates, having, however, just attached 
the Khanate of Khokand, and attributed the status of protectorates to the khanates of Khiva 
and Bukhara (Rywkin, 1963). Thus, the Western Turkestan, which became part of the 
Russian Empire in 1867 and was known as Russian Turkestan, encompassed the most part 
of the lands inhabited by Turkic peoples (Turkmen, Uzbek, Kyrgyz and Kazakh), but did 
not officially comprise the protectorates of Bukhara and Khiva (Bacon, 1966). In turn, the 
Eastern Turkestan (also known as Chinese Turkestan) referred to the easternmost part of the 
region, encompassing lands in northwest China, i.e. the territory of the Autonomous Region 
of Xinjiang (Bacon, 1966).
From 1860 until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Central Asia was under Russian 
rule for little more than a century (Rywkin, 1963). Mark Dickens suggests some factors that 
contributed to the conquest of Central Asia. Let’s emphasize “an instinctive impulse aiming to 
fill the geopolitical gap created by the collapse of the Great Tatar Horde...”; “a historical spirit of 
re-conquest with regard to the territories conquered by the Horde...”; “a traditional anti-Turkish 
stance which easily turned into anti-Islamic attitudes”; and “the perception that the few people 
who inhabited the Asian areas of eastern and southwestern Russia... were an easy target for 
control and exploitation as the region was conquered” (1989: 2).
Under the Russian leadership which was essentially colonial, locals experienced important 
transformations (Bacon, 1966). Over time, the term ‘Turkistan’ had been replaced by the 
term ‘Srednaya Azia’ (from the Russian Inner Asia or Central Asia) (Encyclopædia Britannica, 
2013). Daniel Pipes believes that “like other colonial masters, the czarist government believed 
in the overwhelming superiority of its culture”, in fact “the Russians insisted on using their 
own language, despised local habits and culture, in particular Islam, and revealed attitudes 
characteristic of all European settlers in the Third World” (1983: 6).
The period of Russian dominance was not only marked by the political and economic transition, 
but, above all, by the dominance of Russian culture and language. In practice, the language 
of the ‘colonial occupier’ has become the lingua franca for the Central Asian people (Rywkin, 
1963). The ‘imposed’ popularization of the Russian language was a key element in the grand 
scheme of social engineering designed by Moscow, which had been carried out at different 
levels, on the Soviet republics (the so-called Russification or Russifikatsia) (Bacon, 1966). It 
should be noted that later, the Soviets would develop a theory according to which as long as the 
socialist society moved forward toward true communism, nations would tend to get closer, at 
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the same time a new Soviet culture would emerge (Dickens, 1989: 4). In this respect Bennigsen 
and Broxup explain that:
“A new human being ‘the Soviet Man (Sovetskiy chelovek) will tend to emerge, released 
from the past, free and happy. There will be no spiritual, intellectual, or even physical 
differences between Uzbeks and Russians, Estonians and Kyrgyz; they will share the same 
culture, believe in the same Marxism- Leninism, eat the same food and worship the 
same leaders. The culture of the Soviet Man consists of an harmonious blend of the best 
elements of all other cultures” (1983: 3).
Among the reasons that explain the end of czarist domain, let us stress the adverse socioeconomic 
conditions experienced throughout the empire, compounded by the realities and demands of 
the First World War (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2013). The insensitivity of the Russians to the 
needs of local people, their reluctance to adapt to the local culture, and their concern with 
personal gains gave rise to an atmosphere of constant hostility between indigenous peoples and 
the Russian colonizers (Bacon, 1966).
The Soviet Union was built on the remains of the Russian empire, and continued the same 
colonial way of his predecessor (Mandel, 1942). Therefore, the Soviet Union would strengthen 
and complete the processes started by Tsarist Russia, introducing at the same time, some new 
concepts and projects, characteristic of the communist doctrine (Silver, 1974). At the moment 
when Bolsheviks had won the Civil War, all the old Russian Empire, its protectorates and 
colonies were in an extremely difficult socioeconomic situation (Encyclopædia Britannica, 
2013). The famine that followed the war caused the death of thousands of people. Such 
conditions were even more severe in Turkestan, which had been colonized by the Russian 
Empire (Wheeler, 1977). Given such circumstances, according to Chinara Esengul, “the 
strategy –more friendly and inclusive– of the Soviet authorities who sought to implement a 
process of korenizatsia (‘assimilation’) appeared to be promising” (2009: 47). According to 
the author, “the main objective of the korenizatsia policy was to incorporate local cadres 
along with the Russians, in the management process, as well as in other areas of production 
and industry” (2009: 47). This process was limited by the low level of literacy, even among 
the regional elites. The creation of the Republics, in 1924, was an attempt by Moscow to ‘kill 
two birds with one stone’ (Rywkin, 1963). In other words, this meant pacifying the masses and 
nationalist elites in Central Asia, giving them formal autonomy and independence, retaining 
at the same time, control over the politics and economics of the region (Rywkin, 1963). 
This delimitation was an extension of the principle ‘divide to rule’, previously adopted by 
Tsarist Russia regarding Turkestan (Mandel, 1942). The process of building new Republics was 
intended to prevent the Central Asians to unite into a single pan-Turkic or pan-Islamic entity 
(Encyclopædia Britannica, 2013).
The Soviet period was characterized by an intensive process of ‘state-building’ ... the Soviet 
state (Anderson, 1997). At the same time, the nation-building was well planned by the center 
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that assigned to the new states “formal languages  and culture, and administrative structures” 
(Anderson 1997: 47). However, the process of creating an ‘ethno- national’ identity was limited 
by and subject to development-oriented policies of supranational identity: the ‘Soviet people’ 
(Mandel, 1942). The Soviet nationalities’ policy advocates an eventual fusion with the Soviet 
culture (Carrere d’Encausse, 1978). According to Mark Dickens, “although the Sovietization 
and Russianization were, in theory, two different processes, in practice they often seemed to 
coincide” (1989: 5). The Russians perceived themselves as civilizing agents in Central Asia 
during the Tsarist era, and this self-perception would change little during the Soviet era (Wheeler, 
1966). However , Dickens warns of “the importance of recognizing that the Soviets made 
quite remarkable achievements [in Central Asia]: they reduced illiteracy, higher education has 
become accessible to a larger percentage of the population, medical services have improved 
significantly, and agricultural and industrial production raised the standard of living compared 
to anywhere else in the Islamic world” (1989: 5).
From the outset, Islam had proved more sensitive regarding Moscow relations with locals, 
being perceived by the Soviets as incompatible with the Marxist doctrine (Thrower, 1987). 
Considerable efforts have been made to eradicate the cult of Islam (Mandel, 1942). After 
all, this was considered a potential unifying political force against the Russian governance, 
and seen, from then on, as a threat to the Soviet domination and to the communist doctrine 
(Rywkin, 1963). However, the destruction of mosques and the total ban of the cult in the 
late 20s did not produce the expected results (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2013). On the 
contrary, it forced people “to live a double life during the Soviet era; publicly pretending 
to revere their Communist leaders, while in private, nurturing their pre-communist culture” 
(Olcott, 2002 : 7).
From an economic standpoint, the region, which had been transformed into a source of raw 
materials under the Tsarist leadership, remained as such in the Soviet era. The “white gold” 
(cotton) continued to capture the interest of the Soviets in terms of regional economy (Mandel, 
1942). These were not particularly active in what concerns the development of industry in the 
region, as a matter of fact the Central Asian economies were totally dependent on donations 
from the center, as well as from other Republics regarding staple foods (Encyclopædia Britannica, 
2013). Such an economic policy “seriously affected the environment of the region” (Anderson, 
1997: 116). Indeed, the excessive use of fertilizers and water resources to improve the crops of 
cotton would result in an environmental disaster, as evidenced by the degradation of the Aral 
Sea (Regional report of the Central Asian States, 2000).
The last decades of Soviet rule were important for two reasons: a) the liberalization initiatives 
(1985-1991) of Mikhail Gorbachev, the perestroika and the glasnost established “the immediate 
political context and a catalyst for the early stages of regime transition in Asia Central [and other 
Soviet republics]” (Collins, 2006: 103), b) this period is characterized by “negotiating pacts 
between the main political forces in each Central Asian state” (Collins, 2006: 50). This had 
been a time of change in the power configuration.
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It is interesting to note how the vision of Russian domination affected the writing of history 
during the Soviet era (Dani and Masson, 1992). Prior to 1930, “the official line was that the 
Russian conquest of the non-Russian areas had been ‘an absolute evil’ (absoliutnoe zlo)” 
(Dickens, 1989: 6). Thus, those who resisted Tsarist forces were considered patriotic heroes. 
During the 30s and 40s, “Russian expansion turned to be seen as a ‘lesser evil’ (naimen’sheie 
zlo), compared to what could have happened to the people if the Turks, the Persians, or the 
British had conquered them” (Dickens, 1989: 6). By 1950, “the official view was that the 
Russian conquest had been an ‘absolute good’ “, and those who had fought against it would 
now be condemned (Dickens, 1989: 6).
The post-Soviet era would show that the policy in Central Asia had nothing to do with ideology 
but with the control of economic resources by the major clans. One of the reasons for the 
discontent of most Central Asians is economic, in that “the Central Asian Republics were 
heavily subsidized by Moscow” (Esengul, 2009: 52). On the other hand, “there was not a strong 
nationalist sentiment (civic or ethnic)”, which “conditioned the society’s passivity in terms of 
political participation and social mobilization during the years 1990-1991” (Esengul, 2009: 
52). Loyalty concerned the subnational identities linked to the clans and family (Encyclopædia 
Britannica, 2013). As for Islam, after the efforts of the Soviets in eradicating it, this would no 
longer be a political force susceptible to mobilize people (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2013). Let 
us now draw some brief considerations on the geography and geopolitics of the region.
According to Olivier Roy, “Central Asia is an area of  variable geometry, which can refer simply 
to the Transoxiana or to the cultural space defined by the Turkish-Persian civilizations, stretching 
from Istanbul to the Xinjiang” (2000: 1). Central Asia is bounded by the Caspian Sea, Siberia, 
Mongolia, Tibet and the Hindu Kush. It is, as Rafael Kandiyotti explains, “an interior region 
surrounded by a huge land mass that covers a vast territory of steppes, deserts and mountains, 
occupying more than the space of Western Europe and about half the area of the United States” 
(2008: 76). From a geographic perspective, Central Asia includes Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, while Central Eurasia groups the aforementioned 
countries plus the three states of the South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia).
In the opinion of Doris Bradbury (2011), Central Asia is “a more stable region than Afghanistan, 
Iran and the Middle East in general”, although, as the author states, a large portion of people 
demonstrate “unawareness towards this region” that lies “between some of the major political 
powers”. Among the several common features to the Central Asian republics, it must be said the 
fact that “they’re all ‘inner’ states” (Fourniau, 2006: para.17). Moreover, as Vincent Fourniau 
stresses, “it is nonetheless interesting to note that Central Asia is the region of the world with 
more inner/isolated states (or landlocked, if we prefer), when added to the five states of post-
Soviet Central Asia, Afghanistan and Mongolia” (2006: para.17). Uzbekistan, for example, is “a 
double- isolated country” since “it is surrounded by states that are themselves isolated” (Fourniau, 
2006: para. 18). The fact that the Central Asian Republics do not benefit from direct access to 
the ocean exerts a major influence on their economic development, this being therefore a topic 
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of great interest. This does not mean that Central Asia is a ‘dead end’ in a globalized world. The 
region, which includes the “Great Silk Road”, is, as Levent Hekimoglu regards, “an intersection 
of global routes, coming essentially from all corners of the planet” (2005: 76).
Returning to Fourniau, this author stresses that “unlike the Indian, Chinese, Ottoman or Russian 
peoples, Central Asia is not the result of a major political construction, previous or current” 
(2006: para. 22). Indeed, this expert points out that “history has no record of a single Central 
Asian state” and, moreover, “the unification of the region was due to forces of conquest, mainly 
exogenous” (2006: para. 22). According to Abdul Hafeez Khan, “Central Asia has been, at 
various times, divided, fragmented and conquered, but rarely has served as a seat of power to 
any empire or influential state” (2011: 62). Therefore, this author believes that “the region has 
proved, above all, a battleground for outside powers, than actually a power in its own right” 
(Khan, 2011: 62).
Central Asia is a region that, stricto sensu, only began to be analyzed, from the geopolitical 
point of view, in terms of field research by Western scholars, since 1991, following the collapse 
of the Soviet Union (Banuazizi and Weiner, 1994; Ferdinand, 1994; Fuller, 1990; Mesbahi, 
1994). The term Central Asia characterizes a vast historical set, built around several subunits, 
as well as an amalgamation of economic, political, cultural situations, of identity processes 
and ethnic communities. The fact of constituting an important meeting point for economic, 
geopolitical, religious and ethno-linguistic interests, makes Central Asia an area endowed with 
an extraordinary historical depth, in the heart of the major global challenges nowadays.
The territorial division and the administrative status of the units that compose the region, show 
certain heterogeneity. The current definition of Central Asia, which views it as being formed by 
the Republics that once made  up the USSR (i.e., Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan 
and Turkmenistan), was developed in the mid-twentieth century, in order to distinguish these 
five Central Asian Republics. Shortly after independence, specifically in 1993, “this definition 
has been officially recognized by the Central Asian Republics, as well as by the international 
community” (Malik, 1994: 4).
In turn, for UNESCO, the Central Asian groups “the five former Soviet Republics (Turkmenistan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan)”, but also “Afghanistan, Mongolia, western 
China and several parts of Pakistan, Iran and India” (Asimov, 2001: para. 2). It should be noted, 
like Michael W. Cotter (2008), that despite the economic and political heterogeneity of the 
region, Central Asia is, for all purposes, considered a ‘geopolitical entity’. Several post-Soviet 
studies continue to interpret Central Asia as being limited to five former Soviet Republics: 
Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan (Menon, 2007). This design 
leaves thus outside the above areas, even if these are deeply intertwined geographically and 
historically (Naby, 1994). In the Soviet era, the region was called “Sredniaia Azia” (which, when 
translated, means Middle Asia), comprising “Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan”, 
and leaving out Kazakhstan (Lewis and Wigen, 1997: 179).
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It is interesting to note that while Western experts use the term ‘Central Asia’, the Russian 
authors, in turn, did not (yet) abandon the old expression ‘Middle Asia’, although, unlike the 
past, this includes today Kazakhstan (Ismailov and Papava, 2010). The fact that there are multiple 
interpretations of the concept of Central Asia, thus attests to the lack of consensus about this.
The boundaries of the region were defined and delimited by the Soviets in 1924, at a time 
when the Central Asian nations were mentioned in Soviet documents as “a Muslim/Turkish 
issue” (Koichiev, 2003: 48). Such references were relatively frequent. In fact, according to Petra 
Steinberger, Islam was perceived as “a differentiating factor between the local population and 
the newly arrived foreigners, like the Russians, Ukrainians and other settlers during the tsarist 
and Soviet domination” (2003: 235). So with the arrival of the Russians into Central Asia, Islam 
became an ethno-religious category, because they considered all the peoples of Central Asia 
as Muslims. Before the arrival of the Russians, various ethnic groups of the region, such as the 
Kyrgyz, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Uighurs, the Dungan, had coexisted in “khanates and multiethnic 
empires” (Lowe, 2003: 108). Such coexistence under these premodern supraethnic entities 
was only possible due to the loyalty shown by many people regarding the supraethnic identity, 
Islam.
According to Chinara Esengul, “for almost seven decades of Soviet rule, the Central Asian 
peoples were economically, politically and socially united as citizens of a single state (the homo 
sovieticus)” (2009: 3). However, in 1924, before the unification under the Soviet regime, they 
were divided by Moscow, into five Soviet Republics. On the one hand, as Chinara Esengul 
mentions, “this strategy –ambiguous– had created artificially, political units based on ethnicity”; 
on the other hand, “loyalty should belong to the supranational unity: the Soviet state” (2009: 
3). Therefore, “none of these elements had been well developed; the existence of the Soviet 
supra-state suspended, for several decades, the process of nation building”; moreover, this 
policy of national delimitation had serious consequences, since “these states were ‘artificially’ 
created, rather than develop organically” (Esengul, 2009 : 3).
On top of that, let us mention the fact that the region’s infrastructure operates, from the economic 
point of view, under the strict control of Moscow, for the benefit of the centralized economy. 
There was little trade between Central Asian Republics themselves, and their economies were 
considerably subsidized by the central budget. In the early 90s, subsidies from the metropole, 
constituted “a fifth of gross domestic product (GDP) of Uzbekistan”, and “one-seventh of the 
GDP of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan” (Sarygulov, 1999: 240).
That said, the collapse of the Soviet Union brought to the Central Asian nations not only 
independence and freedom that they had never experienced, but above all, the end of subsidies, 
as well as “a widespread negative economic impact on the lives of most people in this vast region 
of the world” (Linn, 2004: 1). This was the moment when a series of political rifts emerged 
between the Central Asian states. Besides the democratization of the state structure (Tolipov, 
2007), of the ethnic minorities and borders, and the collapse of the common security system, 
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“one of the most pressing issues in the region is the issue of religious extremism and terrorism”, 
analyzed among others, by Mariya Omelicheva (2010). The problem of drug trafficking is also 
urgent in the region, and well-illustrated, among others, by the study of Timothy Krambs (2013). 
Erika Marat stresses in this regard that “as is the case in other spheres of organized crime, the 
Central Asian Republics were not prepared to deal with the increase in drug trafficking, and with 
the problems associated with this” (2006: 45-46). In turn, the issue of water management ranks 
first among the economic and environmental problems of the region, since, as mentioned, for 
example, by Mañé Road and Campins Eritja, “Central Asia is a transnational region with a use 
of shared water, but with an asymmetric distribution of resources” (2012: 2).
Since the collapse of the USSR, the Central Asian Republics have been undermined by instability. 
With a history based, in large part, on the life of clans, a relatively new and inexperienced 
leadership, and an incalculable potential of energy resources, Central Asia has experienced, as 
Philip Shishkin notes, “significant problems of corruption, abuse of human rights, civil unrest 
and conflict” (2012: 4). Afraid of the historical divisions within each country, as the result of 
belonging to clans, and of the growth of Islamic fundamentalist movements in neighboring 
countries such as Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan, the Central Asian leaders have become dictators 
under the pretext of maintaining stability at all costs (Diuk and Karatnycky, 1993). However, 
as already stated by the New York Times in a 1999 article, but very timely, “such artificial and 
temporary stability ends, often, in explosive action” (1999: para.1). Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and 
Kyrgyzstan have been particularly affected by internal conflicts, although as noted by Philip 
Shishkin, “of all the Central Asian republics, Tajikistan is the one that probably faces the most 
troubling set of threats regarding stability” (2012: 14).
Political regimes established in the Central Asian Republics are all authoritarian, even though 
levels of authoritarianism vary according to the countries in question. Following a more precise 
fashion and as Alexander Warkotsch regards, “Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are 
semi-authoritarian states, while Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are run by authoritarian –if not 
dictatorial– regimes” (2008: 62). Central Asia is indeed one of the most authoritarian and 
corrupt regions of the world, as evidenced by evaluations carried out, for example, by Freedom 
House and Transparency International. Indeed, Freedom House (2012) ranks Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan as “non free” in what regards political rights and civil liberties. 
Moreover, these three countries occupy the last positions of the Corruption Perception Index 
of Transparency International (2012). The central and unifying feature of these states lies, in 
practice, on the patrimonial aspects of their regimes. In fact, the main political dynamic (albeit 
informal) is represented by the relation between the Heads of State and certain interest groups 
rather than by the rule of law, or the relationship between the government and its people. In 
other words, “the power of government results from the patronage of powerful networks, tycoons 
of the world business and regional groups” (Azarch, 2009: 65-66). Therefore, “maintaining the 
status quo in the region is in the fundamental interests of the Central Asian Governments”, since 
“the transformation of political and social structures may inevitably lead to the loss of power of 
the current regimes” (Azarch, 2009: 66).
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The region has been, in recent years, attracting the attention of foreign investors due to 
the existence of large reserves of oil and gas in three states: Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan (Babak, 2006; Kenisarin, 2004). However, their authoritarian regimes, and the 
high levels of corruption, an underdeveloped fiscal and banking system, the non-protection of 
property rights, and many other institutional problems, harm, of course, the investment climate 
in the region (Starr, 2003; Marat, 2006).
CONCLUSIONS 
The Central Asian Republics, with their considerable energy and human potential are, as 
Johannes Linn regards, confronted simultaneously with “a challenge and an opportunity”, 
insofar as the “Eurasian economic space is an active part of a new phase of global integration” 
(2007: 5). In fact, Central Asia is, in the understanding of Guo Xuetang, “the region where 
the effects of geopolitics and the competition between the great powers have been the most 
salient compared to any other part of the world” (2006: 117). Indeed, according to this author, 
“ethnic and religious conflicts, energy competition, the strategic positioning of various actors 
and political unrest in the region, have proved a recurring feature in Central Asian regional 
context” (Guo Xuetang, 2006: 117-118).
According to the Consul Fernando Melo Antunes (2012), there are three fundamental reasons 
that explain “the importance of Central Asia to the great powers”. Firstly, “[the area] has energy 
resources in relevant amounts in both oil and gas” (Antunes, 2012). In this respect, Zehra Akbar 
(2012: para. 14) states that “regional and transregional states are well aware of the importance 
of the energy potential of Central Asia”. The region is, in fact, about to become “a major 
global supplier of energy” in particular” in the sectors of oil and gas” (Akbar, 2012: para. 
14). Returning to Fernando M. Antunes (2012), the second reason for the importance of the 
region to the major powers, is due to the fact that their neighbors, “namely China, Russia, the 
Caucasus and Europe” encounter “transportation problems” (meaning logistic terms), likely to 
be resolved and/or mitigated by “the countries of Central Asia”. Finally, the region is significant, 
since it is composed of countries which have gained independence about 20 years ago, “have 
a very significant potential of economic growth” (Antunes, 2012).
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